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Abstract
What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference
evolution is driven by the resulting payos? We show that when individuals’ preferences
are their private information, a convex combination of selﬁshness and morality stands
out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis.
At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or
her own payo. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the
right thing to do,” in terms of payos, if all others would do likewise. We show that
the stable degree of morality - the weight placed on the moral goal - is determined by
the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact.
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1 Introduction
Most of contemporary economics is premised on the assumption that human behavior is
driven by self-interest. However, in the early history of the profession it was common to
include moral values as part of human motivation, see, e.g., Smith (1759) and Edgeworth
(1881), and, for more recent examples, Arrow (1973), Laont (1975), Sen (1977) and Tabellini
(2008).1 Furthermore, in recent years many economists have begun to question the predictive
power of pure selﬁshness in certain interactions, and turned to alternative preferences such as
altruism (Becker, 1976), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999), reciprocal altruism (Levine, 1998), sense of identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000,
Bénabou and Tirole, 2011), preference for e!ciency (Charness and Rabin, 2002), and desire
for social esteem (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). Our goal
here is to clarify the evolutionary foundation of human motivation, by asking from ﬁrst
principles what preferences and moral values humans should be expected to have.
It is well-known from theoretical biology that evolution favors altruistic behaviors–
behaviors that beneﬁt others at a cost to oneself–between relatives. This insight was for-
mally developed by Hamilton (1964a,b); see also Grafen (1979, 2006), Hines and Maynard
Smith (1979), Bergstrom (1995), and Day and Taylor (1998). While the genetics is often
complex, the intuition is simple; a gene in an individual has a high probability, depending on
the degree of kinship, to be present in his or her relatives. In particular, if this gene expresses
itself in behaviors helpful to relatives, the reproductive success of said gene is enhanced, as
long as the behavior is not too costly for the actor. While kinship altruism evidently cannot
explain altruistic behaviors among non-kin, it has been recognized in the literature that any
mechanism that brings about assortativity in the matching process can even favor altruistic
behaviors among unrelated individuals;2 a prime example of such a mechanism is geographic
dispersion. In this literature, the unit of selection is behaviors (strategies) rather than, as
here, preferences or moral values. Nevertheless, if one were to interpret the evolved behav-
iors as resulting from utility maximization, then this literature would point to two distinct
classes of preferences: (a) altruistic preferences, whereby individuals attach positive weight
to the well-being or ﬁtness of others, and (b) moral preferences, whereby individuals instead
are concerned with what is “the right thing to do”.3 Clearly, these two motivations may give
1See Binmore (1994) for a game-theoretic discussion of ethics, and Bolle and Ockenfels (1990), Sugden
(1995, 2011), Bacharach (1999), Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003), Alger and Ma (2003), Alger and
Renault (2006, 2007), Bénabou and Tirole (2011), Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2012), and Roemer (2010) for
alternative models of moral motivation.
2See, e.g., Hamilton (1971, 1975), Boorman and Levitt (1980), Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (1982), Toro and
Silio (1986), Frank (1987,1988), Wilson and Dugatkin (1997), Sober and Wilson (1998), Rousset (2004),
Nowak (2006), and Bergstrom (2003, 2009).
3The idea that moral values may have been formed by evolutionary forces can be traced back to at least
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rise to dierent behaviors. However, this literature is silent as to whether either altruistic or
moral preferences would in fact arise if evolution were to operate on preferences–as a way
for nature to delegate the choices of concrete actions to the individual in any given situation.
It is our goal to ﬁll this gap.
There are several challenges associated with raising the domain of the analysis from
behaviors to preferences. We show that these di!culties can be dealt with in a general
model with minimal assumptions on the class of interactions and potential preferences. More
exactly, we analyze the evolution of preferences in a large population where individuals are
randomly and pairwise matched to interact. We follow the indirect evolutionary approach,
pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992), by assuming that individual behavior is driven by
(subjective) utility maximization, while evolutionary success is driven by some (objective)
payo. A large body of research has shown that natural selection leads to preferences that
deviate from objective-payo-maximization when individuals who interact know each other’s
preferences.4 We focus here instead on the case when each individual’s type (preferences or
moral values) is her private information. Moreover, we relax the commonly made assumption
that all matches are equally likely (uniform random matching) and ask whether assortativity
in the process whereby people are matched to interact aects the preferences that natural
selection favors. Indeed, as we argue in Section 5, assortativity arises in many human
interactions for a variety of dierent reasons.
We impose few assumptions on the set of admissible preferences that are subject to evo-
lutionary selection. In particular, these may be altruistic, moral, selﬁsh, driven by inequity
aversion or commitment to particular behaviors, etc. Our analysis applies to symmetric inter-
actions and to asymmetric interactions with ex ante symmetry, that is, when each individual
is just as likely to be in one player role as in the other. For asymmetric interactions, then,
evolution selects preferences behind a veil of ignorance regarding which role the individ-
ual will eventually play. The matching process is exogenous, and, building on Bergstrom
(2003), we identify a single parameter, the index of assortativity, as a key parameter for the
population-statistical analysis. We generalize the standard deﬁnition of evolutionary stabil-
Darwin (1871). More recent, but informal, treatments include, to mention a few, Alexander (1987), Nichols
(2004) and de Waal (2006). The latter claims that moral codes also exist in other primates.
4See Robson (1990), Güth and Yaari (1992), Ockenfels (1993), Ellingsen (1997), Bester and Güth (1998),
Fershtman and Weiss (1998), Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (2000), Bolle (2000), Possajennikov (2000), Ok and
Vega-Redondo (2001), Sethi and Somanathan (2001), Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2006, 2007) Dekel, Ely
and Yilankaya (2007), Alger (2010), and Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012a). As observed already by Schelling
(1960), it may be advantageous in strategic interactions to be committed to certain behaviors, even if these
appear to be at odds with one’s objective self-interest. Indeed, certain other-regarding preferences such as
altruism, spite, reciprocal altruism, or inequity aversion, if known or believed by others, may be strategically
advantageous (or disadvantageous). For example, a manager of a ﬁrm in Cournot competition, with complete
information about managers’ contracts, will do better, in terms of equilibrium proﬁts, if the contract rewards
both proﬁts and sales, rather than only proﬁts (a literature pioneered by Fershtman and Judd, 1987).
3
ity, due to Maynard Smith and Price (1973), to allow for arbitrary degrees of assortativity
and apply this to preference evolution when each matched pair plays a (Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium of the associated game under incomplete information.5
Our main result is that natural selection leads to a certain one-dimensional family of
moral preferences, a family that springs out from the mathematics. This family consists
of all convex combinations of selﬁshness (“maximization of own payo”) and morality (“to
do the right thing”). We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis and call the
weight attached to the moral goal the degree of morality. A special case is the familiar
homo oeconomicus, who attaches zero weight to morality. At the other extreme one ﬁnds
homo kantiensis who attaches unit weight to morality. We show that evolution selects that
degree of morality which equals the index of assortativity of the matching process. Such
preferences in a resident population provide the most eective protection against mutants,
since the residents’ behavior is the behavior that would maximize the expected payos to
mutants (when rare). It is as if homo moralis with degree of morality equal to the index
of assortativity preempts mutants; any rare mutant can at best match the payo of the
residents.6
We also establish evolutionary instability of all preferences that induce other behaviors
than those of homo moralis with degree of morality equal to the index of assortativity. A
population consisting of individuals that behave dierently would be vulnerable to invasion
of mutants with other preferences. This instability result has dire consequences for homo
oeconomicus, who is selected against in a large class of interactions that are strategic in
the sense that a player’s payo depends on the other player’s strategy, whenever there is
a positive index of assortativity in the matching process. A su!cient condition for this is
that the behavior of homo oeconomicus (when resident) be uniquely determined and dierent
from that of individuals with degree of morality equal to the (positive) index of assortativity.
Our work establishes a link between two strands of literature, one (mostly biological)
dealing with strategy evolution under assortative matching and another (in economics) deal-
ing with preference evolution under uniform random matching. In the ﬁrst strand, the most
closely related work is that of Bergstrom (1995) who analyzes evolutionarily stable strategies
in symmetric interactions between siblings. Bergstrom provides a moral interpretation of the
5Since the matching process is exogenous and an individual’s preferences are her private information,
there is no possibility for partner choice or mimickry. Alternative approaches would let individuals choose
partners (see e.g. Frank, 1987 and 1988) or allow individuals to quit a partner and rematch (see e.g. Jackson
and Watts, 2010). However, these approaches would add informational, strategic and matching-technological
elements beyond the scope of this study.
6In a related literature, on cultural evolution, parents are assumed to be altruistic (or interested in their
future treatment by their children) and, at some cost, they can inﬂuence their childrens’ preferences and
values; see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2001), Hauk and Saez-Martí (2002), Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004), and
Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006).
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resulting behaviors, which he calls “semi-Kantian” (here corresponding to the behavior of
homo moralis with degree of morality one half). In a similar spirit, Bergstrom (2009) pro-
vides game-theoretic interpretations of several existing moral maxims and relates these to
evolutionarily stable strategies under assortative matching. In the second strand, the most
closely related work is that of Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) and Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya
(2007). Their main result for interactions under incomplete information is that homo oeco-
nomicus will prevail, a result that is corroborated in our analysis in the special case when
the index of assortativity is zero.
In classic evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stability is a property of (pure or mixed)
strategies and is usually applied to interactions in which individuals are “programmed” to
strategies (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). As a side result in this study, we obtain a new
perspective on evolutionarily stable strategies, namely, that these behaviors are precisely
those used in Nash equilibrium play when evolution operates at the level of preferences under
incomplete information. Hence, evolutionary stability of strategies need not be interpreted in
the narrow sense that individuals are “programmed” to a given strategy; the same behavior
emerges if they are rational and play optimally under correct population-statistical beliefs
about each other. This sharpens and generalizes the result in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007)
that preference evolution under incomplete information and uniform random matching in
ﬁnite games implies Nash equilibrium play, as deﬁned in terms of the underlying payos,
and is implied by strict Nash equilibrium (again in terms of payos).7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in the next section.
In Section 3 we establish our main result and show some of its implications. Section 4 is
devoted to ﬁnite games. In Section 5 we study a variety of matching processes. Three topics
are discussed in Section 6: asymmetric interactions, the dierence between morality and
altruism, and ways to test empirically the existence of homo moralis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a population where individuals are randomly matched into pairs to engage in
a symmetric interaction with the common strategy set, [. While behavior is driven by
(subjective) utility maximization, evolutionary success is determined by the resulting payos.
An individual playing strategy { against an individual playing strategy | gets payo, or
ﬁtness increment,  ({> |), where  : [2 $ R. We will refer to the pair h[>i as the ﬁtness
game. We assume that [ is a non-empty, compact and convex set in a topological vector
7Strategies used in symmetric strict Nash equilibria are evolutionarily stable, and any evolutionarily stable
strategy playing against itself makes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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space and that  is continuous.8 Each individual is characterized by his or her type  5 X,
which deﬁnes a continuous (utility) function, x : [2 $ R. We impose no relation between a
utility function x and the payo function . A special type is homo oeconomicus, by which
we mean individuals with the utility function x = . An individual’s type is her private
information.
For the subsequent analysis, it will be su!cient to consider populations with two types
present. The two types and the respective population shares together deﬁne a population
state v = (>  > %), where >  5 X are the two types and % 5 (0> 1) is the population share
of type  . The set of population states is thus V = X2 × (0> 1). If % is small, we will refer
to  as the resident type and call  the mutant type. The matching process is random
and exogenous, and it may be assortative. More exactly, in a given state v = (>  > %),
let Pr [ |> %] denote the probability that a given individual of type  is matched with an
individual of type  , and let Pr [| > %] denote the probability that a given individual of type
 is matched with an individual of type . In the special case of uniform random matching,
Pr [ |> %] = Pr [ | > %] = % for all % 5 (0> 1).
For each state v = (>  > %) 5 V and any strategy { 5 [ used by type  and any strategy
| 5 [ used by type  , the resulting average payo, or ﬁtness, to each type is:
 ({> |> %) = Pr [|> %] ·  ({> {) + Pr [ |> %] ·  ({> |) (1)
 ({> |> %) = Pr [| > %] ·  (|> {) + Pr [ | > %] ·  (|> |) = (2)
As for the choices made by individuals, a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium is a pair of strate-
gies, one for each type, where each strategy is a best reply to the other in the given population
state:
Deﬁnition 1 In any state v = (>  > %) 5 V, a strategy pair ({W> |W) 5 [2 is a (Bayesian)
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if½
{W 5 argmax{M[ Pr [|> %] · x ({> {W) + Pr [ |> %] · x ({> |W)
|W 5 argmax|M[ Pr [| > %] · x (|> {W) + Pr [ | > %] · x (|> |W) = (3)
We deﬁne evolutionary stability under the assumption that the resulting payos are
determined by this equilibrium set.9 With potential multiplicity of equilibria, one may
require the resident type to withstand invasion in some or all equilibria. We have chosen the
most stringent criterion.
8To be more precise, we assume [ to be a locally convex Hausdor space, see Aliprantis and Border
(2006). For example, the game h[>i may be a ﬁnite two-player extensive-form game, where [ is the set of
mixed or behavior strategies, see Section 6.1.
9This is in line with the literature on “indirect evolution” – see e.g. Güth and Yaari (1992), Huck
and Oechssler (1999), and Dekel et al. (2007) – and can be interpreted as an adiabatic process in which
preferences change on a slower time scale than actions, see Sandholm (2001).
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Deﬁnition 2 A type  5 X is evolutionarily stable against a type  5 X if there exists
an %¯ A 0 such that  ({W> |W> %) A  ({W> |W> %) in all Nash equilibria ({W> |W) in all states
v = (>  > %) with % 5 (0> %¯). A type  is evolutionarily stable if it is evolutionarily stable
against all types  6=  in X.
This deﬁnition formalizes the notion that a resident population with individuals of a given
type would withstand a small-scale “invasion” of individuals of another type. It generalizes
the Maynard Smith and Price (1973) concept of evolutionary stability, a property they
deﬁned for mixed strategies in ﬁnite and symmetric two-player games under uniform random
matching. However, in a rich enough type set X, no type is evolutionarily stable against all
other types, since for each resident type there then exist mutant types who behave like the
residents and thus earn the same average payo. A deﬁnition of such “behavioral clones” is
given in Section 3.
We introduce a stringent notion of instability by requiring that there should exist some
mutant type against which the resident type achieves strictly less payo in every equilibrium
in all population states where the mutant is arbitrarily rare:
Deﬁnition 3 A type  5 X is evolutionarily unstable if there exists a type  5 X and
an %¯ A 0 such that  ({W> |W> %) ?  ({W> |W> %) in all Nash equilibria ({W> |W) in all states
v = (>  > %) with % 5 (0> %¯).
The next subsection describes the algebra of assortative encounters introduced by Bergstrom
(2003). This facilitates the analysis and clariﬁes the population statistics.
2.1 Algebra of assortative encounters
For given types >  5 X, and a population state v = (>  > %) with % 5 (0> 1), let ! (%) be
the dierence between the conditional probabilities for an individual to be matched with an
individual with type , given that the individual him- or herself either has type  as well or,
alternatively, type  :
! (%) = Pr [|> %] Pr [| > %] = (4)
This deﬁnes the assortment function ! : (0> 1) $ [1> 1]. Using the following necessary
balancing condition for the number of pairwise matches between individuals with types 
and  ,
(1 %) · Pr [ |> %] = % · Pr [| > %] > (5)
one can write all conditional probabilities as functions of % and ! (%):½
Pr [|> %] = ! (%) + (1 %) [1 ! (%)] = 1 Pr [ |> %]
Pr [| > %] = (1 %) [1 ! (%)] = 1 Pr [ | > %] = (6)
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We assume that ! is continuous and that ! (%) converges as % tends to zero. Formally let
lim
%<0
! (%) = 
for some  5 R, the index of assortativity of the matching process. By deﬁning ! (0) as 
we thus extend the domain of ! from (0> 1) to [0> 1), and it follows from (6) that  5 [0> 1].10
Under uniform random matching, ! (%) = 0 for all % 5 (0> 1) and hence  = 0. In pairwise
interactions between siblings, ! (%) = 1@2 for all % 5 (0> 1) and hence  = 1@2, see Section 5.
2.2 Homo moralis
Deﬁnition 4 An individual is a homo moralis (or HM) if her utility function is of the
form
x ({> |) = (1 ) ·  ({> |) +  ·  ({> {) > (7)
for some  5 [0> 1], her degree of morality.11
It is as if homo moralis is torn between selﬁshness and morality. On the one hand, she
would like to maximize her own payo. On the other hand, she would like to “do the right
thing,” i.e., choose a strategy that, if used by all individuals, would lead to the highest
possible payo to all. This second goal can be viewed as an application of Kant’s (1785)
categorical imperative, to “act only on the maxim that you would at the same time will to
be a universal law”.12 Torn between these two goals, homo moralis chooses a strategy that
maximizes a convex combination of them. If  = 0, the deﬁnition of homo moralis coincides
with that of “pure selﬁshness,” or homo oeconomicus; given any strategy | used by the
other party, she will use a strategy in argmax{M[  ({> |). At the opposite extreme,  = 1,
the deﬁnition of homo moralis coincides with that of “pure morality,” or homo kantiensis;
irrespective of what strategy the other party uses (or is expected to use), this extreme variety
of homo moralis will use a strategy in argmax{M[  ({> {).13
A special variety of homo moralis turns out to be important from an evolutionary point
of view, namely homo moralis with degree of morality equal to the index of assortativity,
10This contrasts with the case of a ﬁnite population, where negative assortativity can arise for population
states with few mutants (see Schaer, 1988).
11We thus adopt the notational convention that types  that are real numbers in the unit interval refer to
homo moralis with that degree of morality.
12See Binmore (1994) for a critical discussion of Kant’s categorical imperative.
13In his work on strategy evolution among siblings, Bergstrom (1995) ﬁnds that the selected strategy must
be a Nash equilibrium strategy of a game in which both players have what he calls semi-Kantian preferences.
Such preferences correspond to homo moralis with degree of morality  = 1@2.
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 = :
x ({> |) = (1 ) ·  ({> |) +  ·  ({> {) = (8)
We call this variety homo hamiltonensis. This terminology is a homage to the late biologist
William Hamilton, who suggested that in interactions between genetically related individuals
the concept of ﬁtness should be augmented to what he called inclusive ﬁtness since genes
that drive the behavior of one individual are present also in the relative with some geneti-
cally determined probability (Hamilton, 1964 a,b). In interactions between individuals with
genetic degree of relatedness  (Wright, 1922), x ({> |) is the average inclusive ﬁtness of
mutants in an inﬁnitesimally small mutant subpopulation playing { in a resident population
playing |. For recent analyses of various aspects of inclusive ﬁtness, see Rousset (2004) and
Grafen (2006).
It is worth noting that the preferences of homo moralis dier sharply from any prefer-
ences in which the domain is the payo distribution, such as altruism, inequity aversion,
or a concern for e!ciency. To see this, consider an individual who chooses a strategy in
argmax{M[ Z [ ({> |) >  (|> {)] for some increasing (welfare) function Z . This is a set that
in general depends on the other party’s (expected) strategy |, while homo kantiensis chooses
a strategy in argmax{M[  ({> {), a set that does not depend on the other party’s strategy
(see Section 6.2 for a more detailed comparison with altruism). The theory developed here
also diers from models in the literature on psychological games, see, e.g., Rabin (1993),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
3 Analysis
We begin with some general observations and then proceed to our main result. First, let
EQH (v)  [2 denote the set of (Bayesian) Nash equilibria in population state v = (>  > %),
that is, all solutions ({W> |W) of (3). For given types  and  , this deﬁnes an equilibrium
correspondence EQH (>  > ·) : (0> 1)  [2 that maps mutant population shares % to the
associated set of equilibria. As noted above, all probabilities in (3) may be expressed in
terms of the continuous assortment function !, the domain of which we extended to [0> 1).
This allows us to likewise extend the domain of EQH (>  > ·). One may show the following
by standard arguments (see Appendix for a proof):
Lemma 1 EQH (>  > %) is compact for each (>  > %) 5 X2 × [0> 1). EQH (>  > %) 6= B if x
and x are concave in their ﬁrst arguments. The correspondence EQH (>  > ·) : [0> 1)  [2
is upper hemi-continuous.
Second, for each type  5 X let  : [  [ denote the the best-reply correspondence,
 (|) = argmax
{M[
x ({> |) ;| 5 [>
9
and [  [ the set of ﬁxed points under ,
[ = {{ 5 [ : { 5  ({)} = (9)
In particular, [ is the ﬁxed-point set for homo hamiltonensis, the Hamiltonian strategies.
For any type  5 X, let X be the set of types  that, as vanishingly rare mutants among
residents of type , are behaviorally indistinguishable from the residents:
X =
©
 5 X : < { 5 [ such that ({> {) 5 EQH (>  > 0)
ª
= (10)
Examples of such “behavioral alikes” are individuals with utility functions that are positive
a!ne transformations of the utility function of the residents, and also individuals for whom
some strategy in [ is dominant.14
Finally, the type set X will be said to be rich if for each strategy { 5 [ there exists
some type  5 X for which this strategy is strictly dominant: x ({> |) A x ({0> |) ;{0 6= {>
;| 5 [. Such a type  will be said to be committed to its strategy {.
We are now in a position to state our main result:
Theorem 1 If  ({) is a singleton for all { 5 [, then homo hamiltonensis is evolution-
arily stable against all types  @5 X. If X is rich, [ _[ = B and [ is a singleton, then
 is evolutionarily unstable.
Proof: Given any population state v = (>  > %), the deﬁnitions (1) and (2) of the
associated average payo functions  and  may be re-written in terms of the assortment
function ! as
 ({> |> %) = [1 %+ %! (%)] ·  ({> {) + % [1 ! (%)] ·  ({> |) (11)
and
 ({> |> %) = (1 %) [1 ! (%)] ·  (|> {) + [%+ (1 %)! (%)] ·  (|> |) = (12)
Since  and ! are continuous by hypothesis, so are > : [2 × [0> 1)$ R.
For the ﬁrst claim, let  =  (homo moralis of degree of morality ) and suppose that
({W> |W) 5 EQH (>  > 0). Then½
{W 5 argmax{M[ x ({> {W)
|W 5 argmax|M[ (1 ) · x (|> {W) +  · x (|> |W) = (13)
Thus {W 5 [ and x ({W> {W)  x (|W> {W). Moreover, if  ({) is a singleton for all { 5 [,
then the latter inequality holds strictly if  @5 X: x ({W> {W) A x (|W> {W), or, equivalently,
 ({W> {W) A (1 ) ·  (|W> {W) +  ·  (|W> |W). By deﬁnition of  and  , we thus have
 ({
W> |W> 0) A  ({
W> |W> 0) (14)
14For example, x ({> |) =  ({ {)
2 for all {> | 5 [ and some { 5 [.
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for all ({W> |W) 5 EQH (>  > 0) and any  @5 X. By continuity of  and  , this strict
inequality holds for all ({> |> %) in a neighborhood X  [2 × [0> 1) of ({W> |W> 0). Now
EQH (>  > ·) : [0> 1)  [2 is closed-valued and upper hemi-continuous (Lemma 1). Hence,
if ({w> |w) 5 EQH (>  > %w) for all w 5 N, %w $ 0 and h({w> |w)iwMN converges, then the limit
point ({0> |0) necessarily belongs to EQH (>  > 0). Thus, for any given %¯ A 0 there exists a W
such that for all w A W : 0 ? %w ? %¯ and ({w> |w) 5 X , and thus  ({w> |w> %w) A  ({w> |w> %w),
establishing the ﬁrst claim.15
For the second claim, let  5 X be such that [ = {{} and { @5 [. Then x ({> {) ?
x ({ˆ> {) for some {ˆ 5 [. If X is rich, there exists a type ˆ 5 X committed to {ˆ. Since {ˆ is
dominant for ˆ , individuals of this type will always play {ˆ. Consequently, for any % 5 [0> 1),
({W> |W) 5 EQH (> ˆ > %) i |W = {ˆ and
{W 5 argmax
{M[
[1 %+ %! (%)]x ({> {
W) + % [1 ! (%)]x ({> {ˆ) =
In particular, EQH (> ˆ > 0) = {({> {ˆ)} since { is the unique solution to the ﬁrst condition
in (13). Moreover, x ({> {) ? x ({ˆ> {) is equivalent with
 ({> {) ? (1 ) ·  ({ˆ> {) +  ·  ({ˆ> {ˆ)
which in turn is equivalent with  ({> {ˆ> 0) ? ˆ ({> {ˆ> 0). By continuity of  and ˆ ,
this strict inequality holds for all ({> {ˆ> %) in a neighborhood X  [2 × [0> 1) of ({> {ˆ> 0).
Now EQH (> ˆ > ·) : [0> 1)  [2 is closed-valued and upper hemi-continuous. Therefore, if
({w> |w> w) 5 EQH (> ˆ > %w) for all w 5 N, %w $ 0 and h({w> |w)iwMN converges, then the limit
point ({W> |W) necessarily belongs to EQH (> ˆ > 0), which, in the present case is a singleton,
so ({W> |W) = ({> {ˆ). Moreover, |w = {ˆ for all w. Thus, for any given %¯ A 0 there exists a W
such that for all w A W : 0 ? %w ? %¯ and ({w> {ˆ) 5 X , and thus  ({w> {ˆ> %w) ? ˆ ({w> {ˆ> %w),
establishing the second claim. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 establishes that homo hamiltonensis is favored by evolution and that certain
other types are selected against. The ﬁrst claim is that homo hamiltonensis resists “invasions”
by all types that do not, as mutants, respond by playing homo hamiltonensis’ own strategy.
The intuition is that the unique “evolutionarily optimal” mutant response–in terms of the
mutant population’s average payo–to a resident Hamiltonian strategy is that very same
strategy. In this sense, homo hamiltonensis preempts mutants. The second claim is that
if the type set is rich, then any type that has a unique resident strategy is vulnerable to
invasion if its resident strategy is non-Hamiltonian. The uniqueness hypothesis is made for
technical reasons, and it seems that it could be relaxed somewhat, but at a high price in
15Under the hypothesis of the theorem, it is not excluded that EQH (>  > 0) = B. By upper hemi-
continuity of EQH (>  > ·) : [0> 1) [2, there then exists an %¯ A 0 such that EQH (>  > %) = B ;% 5 (0> %¯).
By deﬁnition,  is evolutionarily stable against  in this case as well.
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analytical complexity.16 However, the intuition is clear: since the resident type does not
play a Hamiltonian strategy, there exists a better reply to it in terms of homo hamiltonensis’
preferences. Because of the nature of those preferences, such a better reply, if used by a
mutant, results in higher payo to the mutants than to the residents. Since the type space
is rich, there is a mutant type that is committed to such an evolutionarily superior strategy
and that will thus use it against any resident, who will then lose out in terms of payos.
It follows immediately from the second claim in Theorem 1 that a necessary condition
for evolutionary stability of any type with a unique resident strategy is to behave like homo
hamiltonensis:
Corollary 1 If X is rich,  5 X is evolutionarily stable against all types  @5 X, and
[ = {{}, then { 5 [.
Example 1 As an illustration of Theorem 1, consider a canonical public-goods situation.
Let  ({> |) = E ({+ |)F ({) for E>F : [0>p]$ R twice dierentiable with E0> F 0> F 00 A 0
and E00 ? 0 and p A 0 such that F 0 (0) ? E0 (0) and F 0 (p) A 2E0 (2p). Here E ({+ |) is
the public beneﬁt and F ({) the private cost from one’s own contribution { when the other
individual contributes |. Played by two homo moralis with degree of morality  5 [0> 1],
this interaction deﬁnes a game with a unique Nash equilibrium, and this is symmetric. The
equilibrium contribution, {, is the unique solution in (0>p) to the ﬁrst-order condition
F 0 ({) = (1 + )E0 (2{). Hence, [ = {{}. We note that homo moralis’ contribution
increases from that of the selﬁsh homo oeconomicus when  = 0 to that of a benevolent
social planner when  = 1. Moreover, it is easily veriﬁed that  (|) is a singleton for all
| 5 [0>p]. Theorem 1 establishes that homo hamiltonensis, that is homo moralis with degree
of morality  = , is evolutionarily stable against all types that, as vanishingly rare mutants,
would contribute | 6= {. Moreover, if X is rich, and  5 X is any type that has a unique
resident strategy and this strategy diers from {, then  is evolutionarily unstable.
Note that the hypothesis in Theorem 1 that  ({) is a singleton can be met even by mixed
strategies { when  A 0 since the preferences of homo hamiltonensis are then quadratic in
his or her own randomization (see section 4).
3.1 Homo oeconomicus
Theorem 1 may be used to pin down the evolutionary stability properties of homo oeconomi-
cus. We immediately obtain:
16For a type  that does not have a unique resident strategy, a mutant’s payo advantage when % = 0
need no longer remain when % A 0. However, if the correspondence is lower hemi-continuous at % = 0, then
we conjecture that the present proof, mutatis mutandis, will hold.
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Corollary 2 If  = 0 and 0 ({) is a singleton for all { 5 [0, then homo oeconomicus is
evolutionarily stable against all types  @5 X0. If  A 0 and X is rich, then homo oeconomicus
is evolutionarily unstable if it has a unique resident strategy and this does not belong to [.
The ﬁrst part of this result says that a su!cient condition for homo oeconomicus to
be evolutionarily stable against mutants who play other strategies than those played by
homo oeconomicus is that the index of assortativity be zero, granted homo oeconomicus
has a unique best reply to all of its resident strategies. This result is in line with Ok
and Vega-Redondo (2001) and Dekel et al. (2007), both of which analyze the evolution of
preferences under incomplete information and uniform randommatching. The second part of
the corollary implies that  = 0 is also necessary for homo oeconomicus to be evolutionarily
stable when it has a unique resident strategy, this is not Hamiltonian and the type set is
rich.
To shed more light on the stability/instability of homo oeconomicus, we distinguish two
classes of interactions, those that essentially are decision problems and those that are truly
strategic. First, consider ﬁtness games h[> i where a player’s payo does not depend on
the other’s strategy. For each individual in a population it is then immaterial what other
individuals do, so “the right thing to do,” irrespective of the index of assortativity, is simply
to choose a strategy that maximizes one’s own payo. As a result, homo oeconomicus can
thrive in such interactions even if the index of assortativity is positive,  A 0.
Corollary 3 Suppose that 0 ({) is a singleton for all { 5 [0. If  ({> |) =  ({> |0) for all
{> |> |0 5 [, then homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable against all types  @5 X0 for all
 5 [0> 1].
In fact, in such interactions homo moralis with any degree of morality  5 [0> 1] is
evolutionarily stable against all types who fail to maximize their own payo.
Secondly, consider ﬁtness games h[>i that are truly strategic in the sense that a player’s
strategy does depend on the other player’s strategy. In order to simplify the reasoning, we
assume that [ is one-dimensional and that  is twice dierentiable, with strictly decreasing
returns to the player’s own strategy. Then the behavior of homo oeconomicus diers from
that of homo moralis with any positive degree of morality. As a result, homo oeconomicus
is in dire straits when the index of assortativity is positive. Letting subscripts denote partial
derivatives:
Corollary 4 Suppose that [0 is a singleton, 11 ({> |) ? 0 and 2 ({> |) 6= 0 for all {> | 5 [.




Our model diers from classic evolutionary game theory in two ways. First, that theory
views strategies, not preferences or utility functions, as the replicators, the objects that are
subject to evolutionary forces. Second, the background hypothesis in the standard set-up is
that matching is uniform. To assume that strategies are the replicators can be formulated
within the present framework as the assumption that each type is committed to some strategy
and that the type set is rich. In such situations one may identify each type with a strategy
and vice versa, and hence write X = [.
Identifying types with strategies, our general deﬁnition of evolutionary stability applies.
For any pair of strategies {> | 5 [, hence types, and any % 5 [0> 1), the average payos are as
in equations (11) and (12), with  being the type committed to { and  the type committed
to |. The dierence between these two average payos, V{>| (%)   ({> |> %)  ({> |> %),
is a generalization of what in standard evolutionary game theory is called the score function
of strategy { against strategy |.17 Applied to the present setting of strategy evolution, the
stability deﬁnition in Section 2 boils down to:
Deﬁnition 5 Let X = [ (strategy evolution) and let matching be random with assortment
function !. A strategy { 5 [ is evolutionarily stable if for every strategy | 6= { there
exists an %¯| 5 (0> 1) such that V{>| (%) A 0 for all % 5 (0> %¯|).
We immediately obtain from Theorem 1 (the proof follows from standard arguments and
is hence omitted):18
Corollary 5 Let X = [ (strategy evolution). Every strategy { 5 [ for which  ({) is
a singleton is evolutionarily stable. Every strategy { @5 [ is evolutionarily unstable.
In other words, every Hamiltonian strategy which is its own unique best reply is evolu-
tionarily stable, and all non-Hamiltonian strategies are evolutionarily unstable. For certain
payo functions , the Hamiltonian best-reply correspondence is not singleton-valued. The
following characterization is a generalization of Maynard Smith’s and Price’s (1973) original
deﬁnition and does not require singleton-valuedness. The hypothesis is instead that the de-
gree of assortment is independent of the mutant population share, an independence property
that holds in certain kinship relations, see Section 5.
17In the standard theory (Bomze and Pötscher, 1989, and Weibull, 1995), !  0, so that
V{>| (%) = (1 %) ({> {) + % ({> |) % (|> |) (1 %) (|> {) =
18Note, however, that here homo hamiltonensis is not included in the type space. Homo hamiltonensis is
instead represented by a set of committed types, one for each Hamiltonian strategy.
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Proposition 1 Let X = [ (strategy evolution) and assume that ! (%)  . A strategy
{ 5 [ is evolutionarily stable if and only if (15) and (16) hold:
 ({> {)   (|> {) +  · [ (|> |)  (|> {)] ;| 5 [ (15)
 ({> {) =  (|> {) +  · [ (|> |)  (|> {)] (16)
,  ({> |) A  (|> |) +  · [ (|> |)  (|> {)] =
(This follows from standard arguments, so no proof is given here.)
The necessary condition (15) can be written as { 5 [, that is, the strategy must be
Hamiltonian. Further, condition (16) may be written
 ({> {) =  (|> {) +  · [ (|> |)  (|> {)]
,  ({> |) +  (|> {)  ({> {)  (|> |) A 0>
a formulation that is consistent with the analysis in Hines and Maynard Smith (1979) of
ESS in ﬁtness games played by relatives; see also Grafen (1979, 2006) and Bergstrom (1995).
Remark 1 In ﬁtness games ? [> A where homo hamiltonensis has a unique best reply
to each Hamiltonian strategy, Theorem 1 and Corollary 5 establish that preference evolution
under incomplete information induces the same behaviors as strategy evolution. Hence, evo-
lutionarily stable strategies also emerge from preference evolution when individuals are not
programmed to strategies but are rational and play equilibria under incomplete information.
4 Finite games
The classic domain for evolutionary stability analyses is mixed strategies in ﬁnite and sym-
metric two-player games, a domain to which we now apply the above machinery. Let D be
an p ×p matrix that to each row l 5 L and column m 5 L assigns the payo dlm obtained
when pure strategy l is used against pure strategy m, for all l> m 5 L = {1> ==>p}. When
players are permitted to use mixed strategies, [ is the (p 1)-dimensional unit simplex
{ (L) =
©
{ 5 Rp+ :
P
lML {l = 1
ª
, a compact and convex set in Rp. The continuous, in fact
bilinear, function  : [2 $ R assigns the expected payo,  ({> |) = { ·D| to each strategy
{ 5 [ = { (L) when used against any strategy | 5 [ = { (L).
Applying our general machinery for preference evolution under incomplete information
to ﬁnite games, for each type  5 X let x : [2 $ R be some continuous function where
[ = { (L). In particular, the utility function of homo moralis, of arbitrary degree of morality
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 5 [0> 1], is quadratic in the individual’s own strategy, {, and linear in the other individual’s
strategy |:19
x ({> |) = (1 ) · {D| +  · {D{ = {D [(1 ) | + {] = (17)
A general stability analysis falls outside the scope of this study, so we here focus on
the more restricted task of identifying the set of homo-moralis strategies in 2 × 2 ﬁtness
games. For this purpose, it is convenient to use the notation {> | 5 [0> 1] for the probabilities
attached to the ﬁrst pure strategy. For each  5 [0> 1], the associated set [  [ = [0> 1] of
homo-moralis strategies is then the solution set to the following ﬁxed-point condition:
{ 5 arg max
{M[0>1]





{ +  ({ {)
1 {   ({ {)
¶
= (18)
Depending on whether the sum of the diagonal elements of D exceeds, equals or falls short
of the sum of its o-diagonal elements, the utility of homo moralis is either strictly convex,
linear, or strictly concave in his/her own strategy, so that the following result obtains:
Proposition 2 Let
{ˆ () = min
½
1>
d12 + d21  (1 + ) d22
(1 + ) (d12 + d21  d11  d22)
¾
= (19)
(a) If  A 0 and d11 + d22 A d12 + d21, then [  {0> 1}.





{0} if d12 + d21 ? (1 + ) d22
[0> 1] if d12 + d21 = (1 + ) d22
{1} if d12 + d21 A (1 + ) d22
(c) If  A 0 and d11 + d22 ? d12 + d21, then
[ =
½ {0} if d12 + d21  (1 + ) d22
{{ˆ ()} if d12 + d21 A (1 + ) d22
Proof : The maximand in (18) can be written as
 (d11 + d22  d12  d21) · {2 + (1 ) (d11 + d22  d12  d21){ · {
+ [d12 + d21  (1 + ) d22] · {+ (1 ) · (d21  d22){ + d22=
For  (d11 + d22  d12  d21) A 0, this is a strictly convex function of {, and hence the
maximum is achieved on the boundary of [ = [0> 1]. This proves claim (a).
19In particular, mixed strategies may have unique best replies. For instance, if  5 (0> 1] and d22  d12 ?
d21  d11, then x is strictly concave in {, for each | 5 [0> 1].
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For  (d11 + d22  d12  d21) = 0, the maximand is a!ne in {, with slope d12 + d21 
(1 + ) d22. This proves (b).
For  (d11 + d22  d12  d21) ? 0, the maximand is a strictly concave function of {, with
unique global maximum (in R) at
{˜ =
d12 + d21  (1 + ) d22
(1 + ) (d12 + d21  d11  d22)
=
Hence, [ = {0} if {˜  0, [ = {{˜} if {˜ 5 [0> 1], and [ = {1} if {˜ A 1, which proves (c).
Q.E.D.
As an illustration, we identify the set [ of homo-moralis strategies, for each  5 [0> 1],







where WU A SV A 0. Case (c) of Proposition 2 then applies for all  A 0, and an interior
solution, {ˆ () 5 (0> 1), obtains for intermediate values of . More precisely, [ = {0} for
all   (S  V) @ (W  S ), [ = {1} for all   (W U) @ (U V), and [ = {{ˆ ()} for
all  between these two bounds. See Figure 1 below, which shows how cooperation increases
as the degree of morality increases. In this example, the hypothesis in Corollary 2 is not
satisﬁed and homo oeconomicus is not evolutionarily unstable for small  A 0. The reason is
that although the behavior of homo oeconomicus is uniquely determined (namely to defect),







Figure 1: The (singleton) set of homo-moralis strategies for (W>U> S> V) = (7> 5> 3> 2).
As a second illustration, consider the hawk-dove game, the original example used by
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) when they introduced the notion of an ESS:
D =
µ




for 0 ? y ? f (see also Grafen, 1979). This game has a unique ESS, namely to use the ﬁrst







The probability for the aggressive and wasteful hawk strategy thus strictly decreases in ,
from its “classic” value, y@f, when  = 0 to zero when  = 1.
5 Matching processes
The analysis above shows that the process whereby individuals are matched aects the
stability condition for preferences, even though the latter are unobservable. This generalizes
the literature on preference evolution, where the underlying assumption has been that the
matching process is uniformly random.20 Arguably, uniform random matching is unrealistic
for most human interactions since it requires that there be zero correlation between the
contact pattern that determines how mutations spread in society and the contact pattern
that determines who interacts with whom. There are, however, many natural sources for a
positive correlation between such patterns. Below we provide examples and present a simple
model in which assortativity is positive in the limit as the population share of mutants tends
to zero.
5.1 Kin
Our ﬁrst example is inspired by the biology literature, which, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, has devoted considerable attention to the evolution of behaviors among genetically
related individuals. For interactions among kin it is straightforward to determine the assort-
ment function ! and to show that it takes on a constant and positive value for all mutant
population shares %. Furthermore, it will become clear that these arguments apply equally
well to traits that are culturally, rather than genetically, transmitted from parents to chil-
dren.
While the following arguments can readily be adapted to interactions between other
kin, we focus here on siblings. Suppose that each child inherits his or her preferences or
moral values from one of her parents. The number of mutants in a pair of siblings is then a
random variable, ], that takes values in {0> 1> 2}, and whose probability distribution depends
on the parents’ types. Let  be the resident preference “type” in the parent generation,
represented in population share 1%, and let the small residual population share % consist of
parents of some other type  . Suppose that a given child inherits each parent’s preferences
20Exceptions are Alger (2010) and Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012a).
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with probability one half, that these random draws are statistically independent, and that
parents are monogamous. The inheritance mechanism could be genetic21 or cultural.22 Then,
the probability distribution for ] in a family where exactly one of the parents is of type
 , is (1@4> 1@2> 1@4), while in a family where both parents are of type  , the probability
distribution for ] is (0> 0> 1). Among families with at least one parent of type  , the fraction
2% (1 %) @ [2% (1 %) + %2] are families with exactly one parent of type  , and the remaining
fraction, %2@ [2% (1 %) + %2], consists of families where both parents are of type  . Since on
average half of the children in the ﬁrst kind of family have preferences  , the probability
that a child with the mutant preference  has two mutant parents is
%2
2% (1 %) @2 + %2
= %=
Hence, Pr [ | > %] = (1 %)·1@2+%·1 = (1 + %) @2. Likewise, Pr [|> %] = (1 %)·1+%·1@2 =
1%@2. The function ! thus takes on the constant value one half, ! (%) = 1@2 for all % 5 (0> 1),
so this is the index of assortativity. Moreover, one half is the coe!cient of relatedness between
siblings (Wright, 1922).23
5.2 Geography, homophily and business partnerships
In our daily lives, we tend to interact more with those who live and work close to us than
with people at distant locations. More generally, we tend to interact more with those who
are similar to ourselves along one or more dimensions–such as language, culture, profession,
religion, dress, origin. This tendency, called homophily, has been extensively documented
by sociologists, see, e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001), and Ruef, Aldrich,
and Carter (2003). In the economics literature, homophily has been analyzed by Currarini,
Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010) and Bramoullé and Rogers (2009). These latter studies
concern race and gender-based choice of friends and meeting chances on the basis of data
from U.S. high schools. Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009) ﬁnd strong within-group biases
not only in the inferred utility from meetings but also in meeting probabilities. We proceed
21In biological terms, we here focus on sexual reproduction in a haploid species. Thus, each child has
two genetic parents, and each parent carries one set of chromosomes, and this determines heredity. Humans
are a diploid species, with two sets of chromosomes, which complicates matters because of the distinction
between recessive and dominant genes. For calculations of assortativeness in diploid species, see Bergstrom
(1995, 2003). See further Michod and Hamilton (1980).
22While Bisin and Verdier (2001) focus on the case of one parent per child and assume that each parent is
altruistic towards its child and makes an eort to transmit its cultural values to its child, here the probability
of transmission of parents’ cultural values to their children is exogenous.
23If the two children would have the same mother but dierent fathers (or the same father but dierent
mothers), one would instead obtain  = 1@4, the coe!cient of relatedness between half-siblings.
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to show, by means of a simple model, how and when homophily may give rise to assortativity
in the matching process, even though preferences are not observable.
Consider a ﬁnite population divided into groups of equal size q A 1. These groups may
be deﬁned by distinct geographical locations, languages or dialects, professions, cultures or
religions etc. Initially, all individuals in the population have the same preferences, or moral
values,  5 X. Suddenly one group is hit by some shock, with equal probability for each group
to be hit. The eect on the group in question is that a random number, ], of its q members
change their preferences or moral values from  to some  5 X, where E []] =  5 (1> q). If
the total population size is Q , the expected population share of mutants is then % = @Q .
After the population shock, pairs are randomly matched to play a symmetric ﬁtness game
as above. The matching is done as follows. First one individual is uniformly drawn from the
whole population (as if looking around for a partner). With probability s (q>Q) 5 [0> 1] the
other individual in the match is uniformly drawn from the same group as the ﬁrst. With
the complementary probability the other individual is instead uniformly randomly drawn
from the rest of the population. In both cases, the matching probabilities are “blind” to
individuals’ types. However, in general the population share of mutants among the matches
drawn for a mutant will not be %, not even on average. For if an individual is of the mutant
type  , then her group must be the one where the shock occurred and hence





= s (q>Q) ·  1
q 1
=
By deﬁnition, ! (%) = Pr [|> %]  1 + Pr [ | > %]. Letting Q $ 4 while keeping the group
size q and the mean value  ﬁxed: % = @Q $ 0, Pr [|> %]$ 1 and
 = lim
%<0
! (%) = lim
%<0
Pr [ | > %] =  1
q 1
· sW (q) > (21)
where sW (q) = limQ<" s (q>Q). Hence, the index of assortativity is positive whenever this
limit probability of intragroup matching remains positive as the number of groups tends
to inﬁnity.24 See Rousset (2004) and Lehmann and Rousset (2010) for richer models of
population structure and assortativity.
Arguably, this simple model can shed some light on the role of homophily for assortativity
in matching. For it appears that “new” preferences or moral values usually arise within a
single group and then spread by way of teaching or imitation within the group before they
either die out, remain group speciﬁc, or begin to spread to other groups. In its initial
stages, such an emergence of a new preference or moral value thus resembles a “mutation”
as described in the simple model above. Under homophily, individuals have a tendency to
interact with members of their own group, usually because it is easier or less costly (e.g., in
24An immediate extension of this simple matching model is to let both the group size and the expected num-
ber of mutants increase with the population size. If q (Q) >  (Q)$4,  (Q) @Q $ 0 and  (Q) @q (Q)$ ,
then  =  · s (q), where s (q) = limQ$4 s (q (Q) > Q).
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terms of distance, language etc.) than interactions with members of other groups. In terms
of our model, we then have s (n> q) A 0, and the index of assortativity will be positive if this
intragroup matching probability does not tend to zero as the number of groups grows.
Sociologists Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter (2003) show that homophily is a strong factor
in the formation of business partnerships. Our simple matching model also applies to this
class of interactions. To see this, consider a large population of business students who after
graduation set up pairwise business partnerships. Suppose that individuals’ business ethics
are sometimes inﬂuenced by the teaching in their school.25 In the model above, let each
graduating class be a group. Now and then, a teacher changes the teachings about business
ethics, and some students are then inﬂuenced by the new material. Under the assumptions
in the model, there will be positive assortativity if, on average, more than one student is
inﬂuenced by the new teaching material ( A 1) and if the probability is positive for partner
formation among classmates even when the number of schools is large (sW (q) A 0). For
example, if the average class size is one hundred, the probability for forming partnership with
a classmate is one half, and if the average number of students per class who are inﬂuenced
by the new teaching material is forty, then   =2.
5.3 Conditional degrees of morality
Although our stability analysis was focused on only one ﬁtness game, the model has clear
implications for the more realistic situation where each individual simultaneously engages in
multiple ﬁtness games. Indeed, insofar as individuals can distinguish the latter, the degree of
morality that will be selected for is simply the index of assortativity in the matching process
that corresponds to the ﬁtness game at hand. For instance, if individuals are recurrently
both engaged in some family interaction with a high index of assortativity and also in some
market interaction with a low index of assortativity, then the present theory says that one
and the same individual will exhibit a high degree of morality in the family interaction and be
quite selﬁsh in the market interaction. More generally, the “type” of an individual engaged
in multiple interactions will be a vector of degrees of morality, one for each interaction,
adapted to the matching processes in question (but independent of the payo structure of
the interaction).
For any given ﬁtness game, an individual’s degree of morality may further depend on
other observable factors, such as group identity. To see this, suppose ﬁrst that group mem-
bership in the matching model introduced in Section 5.2 is unobservable (to the individuals
in the population); then our model of evolutionary stability of preferences predicts that all
25Whether or not preferences acquired in school persist throughout life is an empirical question, which we
do not address here.
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· sW (q) =
However, in many real-life situations, group membership is observable. The evolutionarily
stable degree of morality in an interaction will then be conditioned on group membership.
To see this, suppose that all individuals in the simple matching model know their own
group identity and can recognize others’ group identity (but not others’ preferences or moral
values). Matched individuals can then condition their strategy choice on their own and their
opponent’s group identities. Our model of evolutionary stability of preferences can then be
applied separately to every pair (l> m) of group identities.26 In the simple matching model,
where a mutation occurs only in one group, the index of assortativity in interactions between
individuals from dierent groups is zero (since each mutant in such a pair is sure to meet
a resident). By contrast, suppose that both individuals are from the same group. Then a
mutant will attach probability Pr [ | > %] = ( 1) @ (q 1) to the event that the opponent
is also a mutant, while a resident who is unaware of in which group the mutation has taken
place will assign probability one to the event that also the other individual is a resident in
the limit as %$ 0. Our model of preference stability then predicts that individuals will have




0 if l 6= m
( 1) @ (q 1) if l = m=
This suggests that we should expect individuals, in interactions where their moral val-
ues are their private information but group identity is public information, to typically
show a higher degree of morality when interacting with their observational likes. Arguably
important–but perhaps also controversial–applications abound. One need only think about




Symmetric games may well have asymmetric Nash equilibria that Pareto dominate the sym-
metric equilibria. Since evolutionary stability is concerned with strategies that are best
26In game-theoretic terms, each such pair deﬁnes a subgame in a game of incomplete information (as to
others’ types, but not group identities), and each such subgame is reached with positive probability under
any strategy proﬁle.
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replies to themselves, evolutionarily stable outcomes may thus be socially ine!cient. Con-







for d> e A 0.27 The unique evolutionarily stable strategy under strategy evolution and uni-
form random matching, the mixed strategy { = (d@ (d+ e) > e@ (d+ e)), is Pareto dominated
by each of the asymmetric equilibria; de@ (d+ e) ? min {d> e}. In truly symmetric interac-
tions, where individuals do not have any cue that assigns player roles to them, this is all
that can be said. However, if there is a public randomization device, or institution, that
assigns player roles 1 and 2 to the two individuals in each match, then individuals can con-
dition their action on the assigned role. If each role assignment is also equally likely, then
this deﬁnes a symmetric game in which nature ﬁrst assigns player roles and then the two
individuals simultaneously play in their assigned roles.28 This enables Pareto e!cient play
in the above game. Indeed, play of the pure strategy equilibria is evolutionarily stable, with
expected payo (d+ e) @2 to each participant. This reasoning can be generalized to assorta-
tive matching and to preference evolution in symmetric and asymmetric ﬁtness games. We
brieﬂy discuss two canonical applications in the next two subsections.
6.1.1 Helping others
Situations where individuals have the opportunity to help others are common, and they can
be modeled by way of a random dictator game. Assume that (a) with probability 1@2, player
1’s initial wealth is zK and 2’s is zO  zK , (b) with probability 1@2 the players’ wealth
is reversed, and (c) the wealthier individual may transfer any amount of his or her wealth
to the other. Let { be player 1’s transfer when rich and | 2’s transfer when rich, with




. We may then write the payo function in the form












for some dierentiable function y : [0> 1] $ R with y0 A 0 and y00 ? 0. Here y (z) is the
ﬁtness or well-being that results from wealth z. Homo moralis has the following utility
function:

















27These games are strategically equivalent to hawk-dove games, and, under relabelling of one player role’s
strategy set, battle-of-the-sexes games. See Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2012) for an analysis of symmetry
properties of games.
28This approach was ﬁrst proposed in Selten (1980), for strategy evolution in ﬁnite games under uniform
random matching.
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At one extreme,  = 0, we have homo oeconomicus who gives nothing: {0 = 0. At the





@2, so that they end up with equal wealth. The (ultimate)









something to the other individual is not a concern for fairness (although this may well be
an individual’s proximate motivation). Instead, the ultimate reason is ﬁtness maximization
which may require some smoothing across states of nature because of the assumed concavity
of ﬁtness with respect to wealth. The “right thing to do” may thus be to give something to
the poor. We note that a higher degree of morality implies more e!cient risk sharing from
an ex ante perspective.
6.1.2 Ultimatum bargaining
Consider the following scenario: (1) one monetary unit is handed either to individual 1 or
to individual 2, with equal probability, (2) the party who received the monetary unit, the
proposer, proposes a transfer w 5 [0> 1] to the other party, (3) the other party, the responder,
either accepts or rejects the proposal. If accept: the responder receives w and the proposer
1 w. If reject: the monetary unit is withdrawn, so both parties receive nothing.
A monotonic pure strategy can be represented by a pair of numbers, { = ({1> {2) 5 [ =
[0> 1]2, where the ﬁrst number, {1, is the amount to propose in the proposer role and the
second number, {2, is the smallest transfer to accept in the responder role, the “acceptance
threshold”. The monetary payo to strategy { against a strategy | is thus
 ({> |) = y (0) +
1
2
· 1{{1D|2} · [y (1 {1) y (0)] +
1
2
· 1{|1D{2} · [y (|1) y (0)] >
where y is as it was in the preceding subsection.29 This payo function is clearly not contin-
uous. Moreover, homo moralis’ best reply to a strategy | 5 [ is in general not unique (if
it is a best reply to accept a certain positive transfer then it is also a best reply to accept
any lower transfer). By way of fairly involved but elementary calculations (see Alger and
Weibull, 2012b), one can verify that, for any given degree of morality  5 [0> 1], there is
a whole continuum of homo-moralis strategies. Ultimatum bargaining between two homo
moralis individuals typically admits multiple equilibrium outcomes, always including the
50/50 split which is the unique outcome when  = 1.30
29Here 1D is the indicator function that takes the value 1 in the set D and zero outside it.
30This result is compatible with Huck and Oechssler (1999), who analyze evolutionary dynamics of strate-
gies in an ultimatum-bargaining game under uniform random matching.
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6.1.3 Repeated play
Finally, let us brieﬂy consider a situation where no assigned player roles are given, but where
the (ﬁtness) game with payo matrix (22) is played repeatedly. Suppose further that moni-
toring is perfect. Suppose, more speciﬁcally, that this game is played in rounds w = 1> ==> W and
that payos from dierent rounds accumulate. How would homo kantiensis play? By deﬁn-
ition, such an individual would use some behavior strategy | in \ WW = argmax|M[ W (|> |),
where W : \ 2W $ R is continuous and \W is the non-empty and compact set of behavior
strategies in this repeated game. Preliminary calculations suggest that one strategy in \ WW
is ﬁrst to randomize uniformly over the two pure actions in the initial period and to con-
tinue such (i.i.d.) randomization in each round until an asymmetric action pair has been
achieved and thereafter alternate between the two pure actions in all successive rounds.31
This alternating strategy, |dW , is the only element of \
W
W when W = 2, while for W A 2 any
pattern of play of the two asymmetric action pairs, once the symmetry is (randomly) broken,
also belongs to \ WW . We conjecture that this is the unique strategy in \
W
W if the ﬁtness eect
of repeated play is any increasing, continuous and strictly concave function of the sum of
per-period payos, and if one requires robustness against (arbitrarily) small probabilities of
termination after each round w ? W .32 An investigation of this topic, more broadly dealing
with repeated play among homo moralis of arbitrary degrees of morality, falls outside the
scope of this paper. Such an investigation might shed light on the empirical observation that
human subjects in laboratory experiments engaged in repeated interactions seem to have a
tendency to alternate between asymmetric Pareto e!cient action proﬁles (see , e.g., Arifovic,
McKelvey and Pevnitskaya, 2006).33
6.2 Morality vs. altruism
There is a large body of theoretical research on the evolution of altruism (e.g., Becker, 1976,
Hirshleifer, 1977, Bester and Güth, 1998, Alger and Weibull, 2010, 2012a, and Alger, 2010).
As noted above, the preferences of homo moralis dier sharply from altruism. We ﬁrst show
that while in some situations morality and altruism lead to the same behavior, in other
situations the contrast is stark. Second, we discuss a situation where the behavior of homo
moralis can be viewed as less “moral” than that of an altruist, or even than that of homo
31The use of early rounds of play to coordinate on future action proﬁles was analyzed for repeated coor-
dination games in Crawford and Haller (1990).
32Arguably, even the slightest degree of concavity would favor alternating play in face of even the least
risk of break-down.
33While our approach may explain such behavior, learning models generally fail to do so; see Hanaki et




Altruism is usually represented by letting the altruist’s utility be the sum of her own
payo and the payo to the other individual, the latter term weighted by a factor  5 [0> 1].
In the present context:
x ({> |) =  ({> |) +  ·  (|> {) > (23)
where we will call  the degree of altruism.
The necessary ﬁrst-order condition for an altruist at an interior symmetric equilibrium,
[1 ({> |) + 2 (|> {)]|{=| = 0>
is identical to that for a homo moralis,
[(1 )1 ({> |) + 1 ({> {) + 2 ({> {)]|{=| = 0>
if  = . Nonetheless, the second-order conditions dier (Bergstrom, 2009). Furthermore,
there is an important qualitative dierence between homo moralis and altruists, namely,
that their utility functions are in general not monotonic transformations of each other. This
is seen in equations (7) and (23): for non-trivial payo functions  and strategy sets [, and
for any >  6= 0, there exists no function W : R$ R such that W [x ({> |)] = x ({> |) for all
{> | 5 [. This is seen most clearly in the case of ﬁnite games. Then x is linear in { while
x is quadratic in {: ½
x ({> |) = { ·D| + | ·D{
x ({> |) = (1 ){ ·D| + { ·D{
Consequently, the best-reply correspondence  of an altruist diers qualitatively, in general,
from the best-reply correspondence  of homo moralis, even when  = . Indeed, the
equilibria among altruists may dier from the equilibria among homo moralis also when
 = .
We further illustrate the tension between moralists and altruists, now in a ﬁnite game,
an example suggested to us by Ariel Rubinstein. Take the ﬁtness game which consists in a
one-shot interaction with the payo matrix given in (22), with d = 2 and e = 1, and consider
a homo kantiensis ( = 1), the “most moral” among homo moralis. Such an individual will
play {=1 = 1@2.
Suppose now that such an individual visits a country where everyone plays the ﬁrst pure
strategy, and thus earns zero payo in each encounter. When homo kantiensis interacts with
a citizen in that society, the matched native citizen earns more than she does when interacting
with other native citizens. However, if the visitor were instead a homo oeconomicus ( = 0),
then this new visitor would play the second pure strategy. Consequently, the other individual
would earn more in this match than in a meeting with homo kantiensis. In fact, this lucky
citizen would earn the maximal payo in this game. Hence, citizens in this country would
rather interact with homo oeconomicus than with homo kantiensis. What then if we would
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instead replace homo kantiensis by a full-blooded altruist, someone who maximizes the sum
of payos ( = 1)? Given that all citizens play the ﬁrst pure strategy, the best such an
altruist could do would be to play the second pure strategy, just as homo oeconomicus
would.
This example illustrates that the behavior of homo kantiensis is not necessarily “more
moral” in an absolute sense and in all circumstances, than, say homo oeconomicus or an
altruist. However, homo kantiensis is more moral in the sense of always acting in accordance
with a general principle that is independent of the situation and identity of the actor (moral
universalism), namely to do that which, if done by everybody, maximizes everybody’s payo.
Remark 2 Suppose that the citizens of the country imagined above would like to achieve
the highest possible payo but are not even aware of the second pure strategy. Then homo
kantiensis would, by his own example, show them its existence and thus show how they can in-
crease their payo in encounters amongst themselves. Indeed, an entrepreneurial and benevo-
lent visitor to the imagined country could go one step further and suggest a simple institution
within which to play this game, namely an initial random role allocation, at each pairwise
match, whereby one individual is assigned player role 1 and the other player role 2, with equal
probability for both allocations. This deﬁnes another symmetric two-player game in which
each player has four pure strategies (two for each role). In this “meta-game” J0, homo
kantiensis would use any of two strategies {0=1, each of which would maximize the payo
0 ({0=1> {
0
=1), namely to either always play the ﬁrst (second) pure strategy in the original
game when in player role 1 (2), or vice versa. In both cases, 0 ({0=1> {
0
=1) = 3@2, a higher
payo than when homo kantiensis meets himself in the original game:  ({=1> {=1) = 3@4
(c.f. the discussion in section 6.1.3).
6.3 Empirical testing
An interesting empirical research challenge is to ﬁnd out how well homo moralis can ex-
plain behavior observed in controlled laboratory experiments. Consider, for example, an
experiment in which (a) subjects are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs to play a
two-player game (or a few dierent such games), (b) after the ﬁrst few rounds of play, under
(uniformly) random re-matching, subjects receive some information about aggregate play in
these early rounds, and (c) are then invited to play the game once more (again with ran-
domly drawn pairs). One could then analyze their behavior in these later rounds under the
hypothesis that in this last round they play a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium under incomplete
information, where each individual is a homo moralis with an individual-speciﬁc and ﬁxed
degree of morality. How much of the observed behavior could be explained this way? How
well would homo moralis fare in comparison with established models of social preferences?
In an early experimental study of a prisoners’ dilemma interaction, analyzed as a game of
incomplete information, Bolle and Ockenfels (1990) show that observed behaviors are better
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explained by individual-speciﬁc ‘moral standards’ than altruism. Similar experiments could
be carried out to test the homo moralis hypothesis. It would also be interesting to compare
empirical results for dierent cultures and to see if such dierences can be explained in terms
of assortativity dierences between these cultures.
7 Conclusion
We have here tried to contribute to the understanding of ultimate causes for human motiva-
tion by proposing a theoretical model of the evolution of preferences when these preferences
remain private information and when the matching process is random but may involve cor-
relation between types in the matches. Our approach delivers new testable predictions.
Although we permit all continuous preferences over strategy pairs, we ﬁnd that a particu-
lar one-dimensional parametric family, the preferences of homo moralis, stands out in the
analysis. A homo moralis acts as if he or she had a sense of morality: she maximizes a
weighted sum of her own payo, given her expectation of the other’s action and of the payo
she would obtain if the other party were also to take the same action. We show that a cer-
tain member of this family, homo hamiltonensis, is particularly viable from an evolutionary
perspective. The weight that homo hamiltonensis attaches to the moral goal is the index of
assortativity in the matching process. Our theory further predicts that if one and the same
individual is engaged in multiple pairwise interactions of the sort analyzed here, perhaps
with a dierent index of assortativity associated with each interaction (say, one interaction
taking place within the extended family and another one in a large anonymous market), then
this individual will exhibit dierent degrees of morality in these interactions, adapted to the
various indices of assortativity.
While the general predictive power of preferences à la homo moralis remains to be care-
fully examined, the behavior of homo moralis seems to be compatible with some experimen-
tal evidence (for preliminary calculations in this direction, see Alger and Weibull, 2012b).
What’s more, the goal function of homo moralis appears to be consistent with the justiﬁca-
tions many subjects oer for their behavior in the lab, namely, saying that they wanted to “do
the right thing” (see, e.g., Dawes and Thaler, 1988, Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). While
we leave analyses of the policy implications of such moral preferences for future research, we
note that, in our model, the evolutionarily stable degree of morality is independent of the
payos in the interaction at hand. Hence, the degree of morality cannot be “crowded out” in
any direct sense by economic incentives. For instance, if one were to pay people for “doing
the right thing” or charge a fee for “doing the wrong thing,” this would change the payos
and thus also the behavior of homo moralis, in an easily predictable way, but evolutionary
forces would not change her degree of morality (as long as the matching process remains the
same).
While the self-interested homo oeconomicus does well in non-strategic interactions and in
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situations where there is no assortativity in the matching process, natural selection wipes out
homo oeconomicus in large classes of other situations. Arguably, assortativity is common in
human interactions. Allowing for arbitrary degrees of assortativity in the matching processes,
our analysis suggests that pure selﬁshness, as a foundation for human motivation, should
perhaps be replaced by a blend of selﬁshness and morality. Such a change would aect many
predictions in economics.
This is but a ﬁrst exploration, calling for extensions and applications in many directions
and areas, such as multi-player interactions, asymmetric and repeated interactions, signals
and cues about others’ types, partner choice, public-goods provision, environmental policy,
institution building, voting and political economy.
29
Appendix: proof of Lemma 1




{W 5 argmax{M[ [1 %+ %! (%)] · x ({> {W)
+ % [1 ! (%)] · x ({> |W)
|W 5 argmax|M[ (1 %) [1 ! (%)] · x (|> {W)
+ [%+ (1 %)! (%)] · x (|> |W) =
(24)
By hypothesis, x and x are continuous and [ is compact. Hence, each right-hand
side in (24) deﬁnes a non-empty and compact set, for any given % 5 [0> 1), by Weierstrass’s
maximum theorem. For any (>  > %) 5 V, condition (24) can thus be written in the form
({W> |W) 5 E% ({W> |W), where E% : F  F, for F = [2 and % 5 [0> 1) ﬁxed, is compact-valued,
and, by Berge’s maximum theorem, upper hemi-continuous (see e.g. Aliprantis and Border,
2006). It follows that E% has a closed graph, and hence its set of ﬁxed points, EQH (>  > %) =
{({W> |W) 5 [2 : ({W> |W) 5 E% ({W> |W)} is closed (being the intersection of judsk (E%) with the
diagonal of F2). This establishes the ﬁrst claim.
If x and x are concave in their ﬁrst arguments, then so are the maximands in (24).
Hence, E% is then also convex-valued, and thus has a ﬁxed point by Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point
theorem. This establishes the second claim.
For the third claim, ﬁx  and  , and write the maximands in (24) as X ({> {W> |W> %)
and Y (|> {W> |W> %). These functions are continuous by assumption. Let XW ({W> |W> %) =
max{M[ X ({> {W> |W> %) and Y W ({W> |W> %) = max|M[ Y (|> {W> |W> %). These functions are con-
tinuous by Berge’s maximum theorem. Note that ({W> |W) 5 EQH (>  > %) i½
XW ({W> |W> %) X ({> {W> |W> %)  0 ;{ 5 [
Y W ({W> |W> %) X (|> {W> |W> %)  0 ;| 5 [=
(25)
Let h%wiwMN $ %r 5 [0> 1) and suppose that ({Ww > |Ww ) 5 EQH (>  > %w) and ({Ww > |Ww ) $ ({r> |r).
By continuity of the functions on the left-hand side in (25),½
XW ({r> |r> %r) X ({> {r> |r> %r)  0 ;{ 5 [
Y W ({r> |r> %r) X (|> {r> |r> %r)  0 ;| 5 [
and hence ({r> |r) 5 EQH (>  > %r). This establishes the third claim.
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